Affirming Zionism: What does that mean?

Gideon Shimoni

We are today experiencing a critical peak in the hate-infested defamation of the term Zionism on an unprecedented international scale. The anti-Zionism attack is launched by forces outside the Jewish people, although a variety of Jewish intellectuals and groups have joined it.  To be sure, an undercurrent of intra-Jewish intellectual controversy over Zionism has always existed, despite the Zionist movement’s attainment of near-consensual hegemony in the organized life of Jews. But in the aftermath of October 7^th, acute intellectual dissensus over Zionism has erupted in the Jewish Diaspora.  Today, many Jews who are deeply rooted in the consensual predominance of Zionism in Jewish life since the Holocaust and the establishment of Israel are distressed and perplexed. They ask: can and should one still affirm adherence to “Zionism”? This is the question under discussion at this gathering.  I think I can best contribute, not by offering a subjective personal answer, but rather by addressing the question objectively from my vantage point as an historian, much of whose research and publications have focused on Zionism. Accordingly, allow me to suggest how one should explore the meaning of Zionism in order to decide whether one personally affirms or negates its validity.

Zionism, whether conceived or perceived as a concept or as a movement is a complex multifaceted, variegated phenomenon. A variety of forms, whether foundational or evolutional, ideational, or operational, comprise the phenomenon “Zionism” as a whole. So, I preface my comments with a methodological caveat:- One must avoid faulty reasoning that might be called “essentialistic fallacy”, meaning attribution of absolutely constitutive essence to one particular expression, form, or manifestation of the whole. As a comparative example, consider one’s personal Jewish identity. It would be fallacious reasoning if I were to attribute constitutive essentiality to ultra-Orthodoxy. In other words, if I were to equate Judaism exclusively with ultra-Orthodoxy, and therefore draw the conclusion that, since I am not an adherent of ultra -Orthodox observance, I cannot consider myself to be an adherent of Judaism. Likewise, it would be fallacious reasoning to essentialistically equate Zionism as a whole with, let us say, Bezalel Smotrich’s particular ideological version of Religious Zionism and his consequent, politically empowered policies, and thence conclude that I do not consider myself to be a Zionist.  In other words, no matter how appalled you may be by today’s highly governmentally empowered ideas, policies or actions of this particular manifestation of Zionism, and even if wide popular support gives it the appearance of being mainstream Zionism, it does not make sense to conclude that you must abjure Zionism and disclaim being a Zionist.

So how can one determine if one affirms Zionism? I answer this from an historical perspective, which leads me to posit that one must address Zionism as an ideological construct.  The suffix “ism” signifies ideology.  By "ideology" is meant a sort of cognitive map concerning a given societal reality.  It differs from an academic analytical theory in that it aims not only at knowledge of the reality but also at action to affect it. In other words, ideology is an action-related set of ideas relating to a given reality, in this instance the reality of the Jewish condition in the world.  As such, it can be analytically formulated as a set of propositions.  As an historian, I have attempted to define the propositions that constitute the common denominator of the Zionist ideology over all time and in every place and for all its constituent schools of thought. (I attempted this in a book entitled The Zionist Ideology. One might describe this as a human scientific endeavour equivalent to what today’s A.I. might be prompted to do.) My analysis issued in several basic propositions relating, respectively, to definition of the Jews as a social entity, diagnosis of the problems inhering in the Jewish condition, and proposal of a solution. (Of course, I acknowledge the acceptability of subjecting my formulation to challenge and debate, as long as this is done on the basis of historical evidence.)

The first proposition, defining the nature of the Jews as a social entity, is that the Jews are a distinctive entity possessing attributes associated with the modern concepts of ethnicity and nation, not just those associated with religion.  In the booklet Der Judenstaat, Theodor Herzl's seminal presentation of the Zionist idea, he declared most emphatically, "Wir sind ein volk" (We are a people) and he argued that this is the key to diagnosing the Jewish condition and solving its problems. What is "a people" (עם) ? It  is the common term for a human social entity consensually described in contemporary social science as an "ethnic group." Serviceable definitions of "ethnic group" run something like – a named group of people that shares a belief in common ancestry or origin, whether factual or mythical. This is ethnicity’s constitutive factor.  It is something akin to a sense of family but on a vastly enlarged scale. Complementing this are  a variety of shared cultural characteristics, such as a specific language or languages, religious codes, beliefs or rituals, historical experiences and memories, connections to specific territorial spaces or memories of territorial homelands. These foster a sense of interdependence of fate and provide some measure of cohesion however fluctuating in valence over time. This understanding of the nature of the Jewish entity distinguished the adherents of Zionism sharply from its major Jewish opponents; those who advocated the panacea of emancipation and integration (sometimes misguidedly termed “assimilation”) into the civic, cultural and national identity of each and every host society. Hence, they abjured all nationalist-related Jewish attributes. Historians have generally labeled them non-Zionists (i.e., passive negators of Zionist ideology) or anti-Zionists (i.e., active opponents of Zionism). The ultra-Orthodox opponents of Zionism had objections of a different nature, primarily theological, but these are beyond the scope of the present discussion.

A second proposition, diagnosing the perceived problematic situation of the Jewish entity, posited that its situation under conditions of dispersion devoid of a territorial homeland, was critically defective in a worldly sense. (This is to say, not only in the religious sense, which perceived galut to be defective because Jews await ge'ula as ultimate messianic redemption.)

A third proposition, relating to the advocated solution, ranged from the limited conception of gradual ingathering and settlement of Jews in a territorial homeland (initially wavering somewhat between insistence upon Eretz Israel and contemplation of any suitable territory) under conditions of cultural autonomy, to the more radical aspiration for a sovereign Jewish state and polity and the optimal gathering therein of members of the Jewish people.

From the beginning and to this day there has been a wide range of differing views within parameters set by these Zionist propositions.  The most significant revolved around such questions as “what form should the aspired-for homeland take? An autonomous Jewish territory? Anywhere, or only in the land Jews call Eretz Israel, (which was within the imperial Ottoman framework until about 1917 and under British imperial mandate until 1948).  A sovereign nation-state of Jews? A shared bi-national type of state? and so on.  It is important to know that in that context there always were some dogmatic extremists who charged those who aired views contrary to their own with the label “anti-Zionism”. (This should simply be regarded as groundless dogmatic rhetoric.) For example, it was the charge made by some conservative or ultra-nationalist Zionists, against liberal or moderately nationalist Zionist thinkers like Judah Magnes and Martin Buber. However, viewed in historical perspective, they were all part and parcel of Zionist ideology.

In years before the establishment of Israel, what were the ideological counter-propositions of those who could be   labelled “non-Zionist” or “anti-Zionist”?  In fact, until the Second World War, most leaders of Jewish community institutions, particularly religious leaders of both Reformed and modern-Orthodox Judaism (at first also called Neo-orthodox) were such negators of Zionism.  Their major counter-propositions were:  1. The Jews are not an ethnic group or people. They are adherents of a religion-- Judaism.  2. As such, they neither need nor have moral entitlement for national self-determination in any territory.  Their only genuine need is to be freely integrated (sometimes the term used was “assimilated”) as equal citizens and allowed to practice their faith, alongside other religious denominations, in whichever territorial state they are situated. Moreover, they argued not only that Zionism was misguided and delusional; it was also harmful because, by self-admission, its propositions justified the anti-Semitic charge that Jews were unassimilable aliens everywhere.

There also were some Jewish groups that concurred with some Zionist propositions, but disassociated themselves from others. For example, they agreed with the Zionist proposition that the Jews were a people, but rejected the proposition that they needed independent territorial self-determination or sovereign statehood or the correlated view that this had to be only in the Land of Israel. The most notable were adherents of the socialist Jewish Workers Bund, Territorialists who futilely sought a territory other than Eretz Israel, and whose seminal ideologist was Israel Zangwill, and Autonomists who advocated gaining politically grounded communal autonomy in the diaspora and whose seminal ideologist was Simon Dubnow.

There also were some Jewish groups that concurred with some Zionist propositions, but disassociated themselves from others. For example, they agreed with the Zionist proposition that the Jews were a people, but rejected the proposition that they needed independent territorial self-determination or sovereign statehood or the correlated view that this had to be only in the Land of Israel. The most notable were adherents of the socialist Jewish Workers Bund, Territorialists who futilely sought a territory other than Eretz Israel, and whose seminal ideologist was Israel Zangwill, and Autonomists who advocated gaining politically grounded communal autonomy in the diaspora and whose seminal ideologist was Simon Dubnow.

So much for the record up to the establishment of the State of Israel. Today, there can be no doubt that the existence of Israel marks a new reality, primarily because Jews are no longer in a condition of total dispersion and national homelessness. Yet, the Jewish condition in the world remains gravely challenged, if not endangered, by enduring antisemitism, unrelenting threats to both the moral entitlement of Jews to have established Israel and to its continued existence, as well as to repercussions of its conduct throughout the Jewish Diaspora.  In this reality, the basic ideological proposition of contemporary Zionism might be formulated thus: The Jews are a people that has both a need for, and moral entitlement to, realisation of  its national self-determination through the secure existence and thriving of Israel; a corollary of this proposition being that  this is of central significance for Jewish life everywhere. Plainly stated, to affirm this proposition is to be a “Zionist”: to reject this proposition wholly or partly is to be a “non-Zionist”; to actively oppose those who affirm it is to be an “anti-Zionist.”

To elaborate:  Today there are still some Jewish intellectuals who argue that Jews are not a “people” as did most of Reformed Judaism before the Holocaust and the establishment of Israel.  An example is Shlomo Sand, an Israeli academic who wrote a book entitled “The Invention of the Jewish People.”  He should indeed be labelled non-Zionist or anti-Zionist. Another notable example is Judith Butler, most famous as an American Jewish feminist philosopher and gender studies scholar. She argues not only that Jews have neither need nor entitlement to a sovereign state but that the very existence of Jewish political sovereignty is contrary to, or incompatible with, fundamental Jewish ethical values. She holds that these are rightly congruent only with a diasporic condition of Jewish life. However, today, most Jews who contest Zionism,  do not reject Zionism’s propositions in such clear-cut terms. Most argue that, although Jews are indeed a people, they do not need to exercise nationalist self-determination, nor do they have moral entitlement to do so in the place or in the way that Zionists established Israel. Also, they hold that if the existence of Israel is indeed of central significance to Jewish life everywhere, it is harmfully so. To uphold some or all of these counter-propositions is to be a “non-Zionist” or “anti-Zionist”.

My main point is: It is rationally feasible to affirm Zionism yet to reject and oppose – no matter how avidly and profoundly so-- the manner in which national self-determination is actually being exercised in the form of the state of Israel. In other words, as a Zionist one can disapprove of the policies and actions of the government of Israel and oppose them. This is a positionality that can be, and is in fact, adopted by many Zionism-affirming Jews, irrespective of their living in Israel or any other country. Currently, controversy among those who hold this position revolves mainly around two questions, neither of which is entirely new. The first question is: Is statehood sovereignty (i.e., a “Jewish State” or “Jewish-nation-state”) absolutely necessary for Jewish national self-determination, or can and should sub-state conditions suffice? The second question is what should “centrality” of Israel mean for the Jewish people as a whole, i.e., for diasporic Jewish life?

The sovereignty question is being revitalized within Israel not only by  a considerable number of prominent  intellectuals, including past or present political personalities (for example, former Knesset Speaker and also Chairman of the Jewish Agency, Avrum Burg), as well as by several civic political organizations;  for example, Peace Now, and Standing Together. In the diaspora, primarily in North America, it is raised by  several individual intellectuals, for example, Shaul Magid (best known as a modern Jewish Studies academic)  and Daniel Boyarin (best known as  a Talmudic Culture academic) who wrote a book entitled The No-State Solution. In so far as the statehood sovereignty issue is premised on the Jewish people’s need and right to exercise self-determination, advocacy of a range of alternatives to the Jewish ethno-state character of Israel remains within the historical parameters of Zionist ideology. These include not only ideas of two-state partition but also a variety of notions of sub-state autonomy or a bi-national state.

My  historical perspective  leads me  to  attribute to the fog of conceptual confusion the automatic labelling of these ideas as “anti-Zionist.” Limiting myself, for the the sake of brevity,  to the particularly profound and challenging views of Shaul Magid, expressed in his recently published work entitled The necessity of Exile,  I would say, although without absolute certainty, that what we are witnessing is not a new anti-Zionist ideology of “Diasporism”. Rather, it is the revival and acute sharpening of controversy that has existed within the ideological history of  Zionism from its inception. Indeed, Magid himself equivocates candidly about labelling his position, until tentatively calling it  “counter-Zionism,” and he acknowledges that it has historical precedents. Utterly  disillusioned  with what he perceives Israel to have become  today, he denies the  ethical possibility of attaining  Zionism’s goal of Jewish self-determination (a goal that  he supports) through an entity that  purports to be a  Jewish-democratic State.  This leads him, so to speak,  to negation of  the “Negation of the Galut” and  the  consensually embedded  notion that  Israel should occupy centrality in the identity formation of Jews and  serve as inspiration for Jewish life throughout the diaspora.

Magid’s critique of  the Israel’s “centrality” proposition is not entirely new. The “Negation of Galut” notion was never a universally acknowledged principle in Zionist thought. Most leading American-Jewish Zionists rejected it. The meaning of  “centrality” was debated heatedly in the earliest official ideological debates held  after the establishment of Israel. Some intellectuals  held  that Israel was inherently central because under conditions of modernity a full Jewish life and culture is possible only in a sovereign framework that comprises one’s own people’s  language, public space, cycle of holidays and commemorations, etc.  They argued that, whereas before modernity, Jews had degrees of communal autonomy that sufficed, this is no longer possible today. Other important Zionist intellectuals, most notably Mordecai Kaplan,  argued contrarily that Israel’s centrality was  merely contingent upon Israel’s  need for material and diplomatic support from all Jews and diaspora Jewry’s need to draw inspiration from Israel’s autonomously Jewish resources. They claimed  that  within multi-cultural, liberally democratic countries such as the U.S.A., Diaspora Jewish life had equal value and viability. Regarded in historical perspective, Magid’s views on the value of Diasporic Jewish life independently of Israel are but a radical extension of views that were aired by Mordecai Kaplan.

In summation of my contribution to this discussion: I submit that an historically grounded analysis is a necessary prescription for rationally navigating the conceptual confusion that envelopes the question – Affirming Zionism: What does that mean?

This article was requested as a textual version of the oral contribution made to the Kaleidoscope discussion in Jerusalem in 2025.